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Abstract—The device-to-device (D2D) communication theoret-
ically provides both the cellular traffic offloading and convenient
content delivery directly among proximity users. However, in
practice, no matter in underlay or overlay mode, the employment
of D2D may impair the performance of the cellular links.
Therefore, it is important to design a spectrum sharing scheme,
under which the performance of both links can be improved
simultaneously. In this paper, we consider the cell-edge user
(CEU) scenario, where both sides have the demand to improve the
quality of experience or service. Therefore, CEUs and D2D users
both have intentions to form pairs, namely, CEU-D2D pairs, to
cooperate mutually. Different from the conventional equilibrium
point evaluation, the stable matching between D2D users and
CEUs are formulated under matching theory framework instead.
For each CEU-D2D pair, a two-stage pricing-based Stackelberg
game is modeled to describe the willingness to cooperate, where
the win-win goal is reached finally.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the wireless networks witness a dramatically
increasing demand of local area service. In this context, a
promising technology called device-to-device (D2D) commu-
nication, which enables direct communication between two
mobile users in proximity without through base station, has
attracted attention in both industry and academic [1], [2]. The
adoption of D2D communications brings many advantages
[3]: allowing high-rate, low-delay, low-power transmission,
extending the cellular coverage, etc.
One big challenge for implementing D2D communication
is how to allocate spectrum resource for D2D communications
efficiently. Due to the controllable interference in licensed
spectrum, it has been proposed that both the D2D and cellular
users share the same spectrum, namely, underlay D2D and
overlay D2D mode [4]. For the former, the D2D and cellular
links use the same spectrum at the same time, which could
increase the spectrum reuse factor if a well designed inter-
ference management is available. For the latter, the operator
allocates dedicated cellular resource to D2D links, which will
incur lower spectrum efficiency albeit less interference.
However, no matter in underlay or overlay mode, most
literature mainly focuses on improving the performance of
D2D links while ensuring that the performance of cellular links
will not be severely degraded. The utility of cellular link is
rarely considered. Furthermore, because information is directly
exchanged between D2D users bypassing base station (BS),
the operator can only charge the D2D users based on how
much resource they use irrespective of the data flow through
D2D link [5], which may lead to lower utility. Therefore, it is
still important for the operator to design a spectrum sharing
scheme to improve its utility, which can also incentive D2D
devices owned by selfish users to participate at the same time.
On the one hand, for D2D users who aim to improve the
quality of experience, the unlicensed band is free but too
crowded, while sharing licensed spectrum provides higher per-
formance but relies upon an agreement with BS. On the other
hand, in cellular network, the cell-edge users (CEUs) usually
suffer from poor channel condition so that their performance
requirements are often hard to meet. Therefore, if D2D users
assist CEU transmissions in exchange for access to licensed
spectrum, the win-win outcome is achieved and higher benefit
is available for the operators.
Cooperative relay technology [6] is a promising technology
in improving the spectrum efficiency of cellular networks.
In such scheme, the source broadcasts the signal to the
destination and mobile users nearby first, and then these
users help relay the received signal to the destination. The
well-known relaying schemes include Amplify-and-Forward
(AF) and Decode-and-Forward (DF). Motivated by this, many
cooperative D2D communication relaying schemes for cellular
networks [7]–[9], where D2D users can serve as a relay for
the cellular user to earn opportunity to access the licensed
spectrum band, are proposed. However, these schemes are
designed from the perspective of D2D links.
In this paper, we investigate a cooperative spectrum sharing
scheme between D2D users and CEUs. When CEUs suffer
from poor performance, they can select D2D transmitter
as relay to satisfy their requirements, and these D2D pairs
are able to access licensed spectrum in return. Utilities of
cellular links and D2D links are both considered. A joint
optimization framework based on game theory is proposed
to characterize this kind of cooperation. Stackelberg game is
used to model the interaction between CEU and D2D pair.
Furthermore, when there are several CEUs and D2D pairs,
they all seek appropriate partners to maximize their utilities.
Thus we model the pairing problem as a marriage market to
find stable CEU-D2D pairs given the preferences of both sides.
Analytic and numerical results show that the proposed scheme
can improve the performance of CEU and D2D users can
gain considerable throughput, which makes both sides have
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Fig. 1: Frame Structure
intentions to cooperate. Moreover, under mild conditions, CEU
can push the utility of the paired D2D user to be zero because
of its leading role in the cooperation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the system model and problem formulation are established.
In Section III, The joint optimization algorithm is presented.
The Section IV gives the numerical results and performance
analysis, and finally Section V concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider a single cell of cellular networks. There are
M cell-edge users that communicate in conventional way
through base station. We assume these users suffer from poor
channel conditions so that their date rate requirements in the
uplink can’t be satisfied. Only uplink scenario is considered
in this paper because of the limited power budget of user
equipments. Let M = {1, 2, · · · ,M} define the set of these
users. Besides, there are N transmitter-receiver pairs already
operating in D2D mode. The set of D2D pairs is denoted by
N = {1, 2, · · · , N}. There is no dedicated channel for D2D
communication. Therefore, in order to transmit its own data,
the D2D user relays the cellular data in the uplink and gets
access to the channels occupied by CEUs alternatively.
We assume the time division multiple access (TDMA)
technique is adopted. In case of cooperation, the normalized
frame structure is shown in Figure.1. In order to reduce
overhead, we assume only D2D transmitters are involved in
relay procedure1. In the first phase, CEU broadcasts its data
with power PC to D2D transmitter (DT) and BS. In the second
phase, DT relays the received data with power PD to BS in
decode-and-forward way. In the last phase, DT transmits its
own data to D2D receiver (DR) with power PD . The first
phase and second phase both last α of the frame length, which
constitute the relay transmission provided by D2D users for
CEU. The third phase lasts (1 − 2α) of the frame length,
which is allocated for D2D link. We refer to α as allocation
coefficient.
The distanced based pathloss channel model considering
multi-path fading [10] is used in this paper. The notations
for channel gains between different nodes are listed in table
I. We assume the channel gains are known to all nodes. Let
N0 denote the noise power.
1The scheme proposed can also be applied to the case where D2D receivers
are allowed to relay for CEU. In this case, for a D2D pair, the device
bringing higher utility is selected to provide relay transmission for CEU,
which, however, will introduce extra overhead.
TABLE I: Notations for Channel Gains
notation physical meaning
hib channel gain between ith CEU and BS
hij channel gain between ith CEU and jth DT
gjb channel gain between jth DT and BS
gj channel gain between jth DT and jth DR
B. Problem Formulation
The achievable data rate of CEU i in the direct link, denoted
by Ri, is
Ri = log2(1 +
PChib
N0
), (1)
The outage refers to the case that Ri < Rth, whereRth defines
the data rate requirement.
When cooperating with D2D user j, the data rate RiC for
ith CEU is limited by the minimum rate of the first two
transmission phase, i.e.:
RijC (αij) = αij min{R
ij
1 , R
ij
2 }, (2)
where
Rij1 = log2(1 +
PChij
N0
),
Rij2 = log2(1 +
PChib
N0
+
PDgjb
N0
).
For convenience, we define rijC , min(R
ij
1 , R
ij
2 ). If R
ij
C ≥
Rth, the win-win situation will be achieved, which encourage
CEU to cooperate with D2D pairs. At the same time, the
achievable data rate of D2D link is
RijD(αij) = (1− 2αij) log2(1+
PDgj
N0
) , (1− 2αij)r
ij
D , (3)
where rijD , log2(1+PDgj/N0). However, if R
ij
C < Rth, the
cooperation couldn’t be reached and RijD = 0.
Moreover, in order to avoid spectrum overuse, D2D pairs
have to pay for using the licensed spectrum, referred to as
spectrum leasing [11]. Therefore, payoff function for D2D is
defined as following:
U ijD (αij , cij) =β1uD(R
ij
D(αij))− β2PDαij − cij(1− 2αij).
(4)
In (4), uD(·) is the satisfaction of D2D pair j with its data rate,
β1 is the equivalent revenue with respect to the satisfaction of
D2D pair j and β2 is the cost per unit relay transmission
energy. We define uD(·) in the logarithmic form in this paper,
namely uD(·) = ln(·). Besides, cij is the price coefficient.
The payoff consists of three parts. The first term is the benefit
from achievable transmission rate, the second term is the cost
of energy for relay and the last term is the price charged for
leasing spectrum. In addition, the payoff function of CEU can
be defined as
U ijC (αij , cij) = β1uC(R
ij
C (αij)) + cij(1 − 2αij), (5)
where uC(·) is the satisfaction of CEU i with its transmission
rate. We define uC(·) in the logarithmic form also. The first
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Fig. 2: Joint optimization framework
term is the equivalent revenue in terms of satisfaction and
the second term is the payment from jth D2D pair. When
RijC < Rth, we define that U
ij
C = U
ij
D = 0.
Because all CEUs and D2D users are selfish, they have
the incentive to maximize their performance. Therefore, it
is natural to formulate the problem from a game theoretic
perspective. In this paper, we focus on the following three
problems.
1) Pairing Problem: Each CEU is selfish and can always
make autonomous decision about its partner. Each D2D pair
can also make its own decision to choose its partner. Therefore,
it is important to decide a stable matching between CEUs
and D2D pairs, in which each CEU and D2D pairs have no
intention to deviate.
2) Pricing Adjustment Problem for each CEU: Each CEU
can control the price charged to D2D pairs for access to its
occupied channel.
3) Spectrum Leasing Problem for each D2D pair: Each
D2D pair can decide the allocation coefficient αij to improve
its performance further given the price imposed by CEU.
Motivated by the hierarchical game model proposed in [12],
we consider the joint hierarchical optimization framework ad-
dressing above three problem in this paper. More specifically,
we model the pairing problem as marriage market problem.
Then we establish a Stackelberg game, in which CEU is the
leader to decide the price and D2D pair is the follower. The
entire framework is depicted in Fig.2.
III. JOINT OPTIMIZATION FRAMEWORK
A. Stackelberg Game for Pricing and Spectrum Leasing
When CEU i and D2D pair j are paired, CEU i can
determine the price cij charged to D2D pair j in its occupied
spectrum, and D2D pair can decide αij which would influence
the utility of CEU. The interaction between CEU and D2D
pair, that decides their actions to be taken in sequential manner,
makes it natural to model the above pricing and spectrum
leasing problem as a Stackelberg Game. The CEU is a leader
and its action is to decide the price when D2D pair accesses
its occupied spectrum. The D2D pair is a follower and it
determines the αij according to the price imposed by CEU.
We seek a Stackelberg equilibrium to the proposed problem
using backward induction method.
When given the price charged by ith CEU, the best strategy
α∗ij for jth D2D pair can be found as an optimization problem
shown in (6).
max
αij
U ijD (αij , cij), (6a)
s.t. RijC ≥ Rth, (6b)
0 < αij < 0.5, (6c)
RijC = αijr
ij
C , (6d)
The first constraint guarantees that CEU is willing to cooper-
ate. It is easy to find out that if rijC ≤ 2Rth, the problem is
infeasible.
Proposition 1: Suppose rijC > 2Rth, then the solution to
problem (6) is:
α∗ij(cij) =


Rth
r
ij
C
, cij ≤
β2PD
2 +
β1r
ij
C
r
ij
C
−2Rth
1
2 −
β1
2cij−β2PD
, otherwise
. (7)
Proof: Omitted for brevity.
As the leader of the game, CEU i decides the price cij
to maximize its utility with the knowledge of the strategy of
jth D2D pair according to its decision. Therefore, the optimal
price can be found as following:
max
cij
U ijC
(
α∗ij(cij), cij
)
(8a)
s.t. U ijD
(
α∗ij(cij), cij
)
≥ 0, (8b)
cij ≥ 0, (8c)
The first constraint is used to guarantee the D2D pair has the
intention to cooperate. It is easy to verify that if β1 ln((1 −
2Rth
r
ij
C
)rijD)− β2PD
Rth
r
ij
C
< 0, the problem above is infeasible.
Theorem 1: Suppose the pair is formed by ith CEU and jth
D2D pair, and below conditions are satisfied:
rijC > 2Rth, (9)
β1 ln((1 − 2
Rth
rijC
)rijD)− β2PD
Rth
rijC
≥ 0. (10)
Then, (c∗ij , α
∗
ij) is the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game,
where α∗ij is given in (7) and c
∗
ij is expressed as following:
c∗ij = argmax
c∈C
U ijC (c, α
∗
ij(c)). (11)
The set C is defined as following:
C =


{c1, c2} c < c2 < c
{c1} c < c
{c1, c, c} otherwise
,
where
c1 =min

c,
β1 ln((1− 2
Rth
r
ij
C
)rijD)− β2
Rth
r
ij
C
PD
1− 2Rth
r
ij
C

 ,
c2 =
β2PD
2
+
β1β2PD
β2PD − 2β1
,
c =
β2PD
2
+ β1r
ij
D/e
1+
β2PD
2β1 ,
c =
β2PD
2
+
β1r
ij
C
rijC − 2Rth
.
Proof: Omitted for brevity.
If cooperation can’t be reached, which means that problem
(6) or problem (8) is infeasible, we define that U ijC =
U ijD = 0. Furthermore, under a mild condition, we find that
U ijD (cij , αij) = 0.
Proposition 2: If β2PD < 2β1, then U
ij
D (c
∗
ij , α
∗
ij) = 0.
Proof: If c1 = c, then it means that the following
inequality holds:
β2PD
2
≤
β1 log((1− 2
Rth
r
ij
C
)rijD)− β2
Rth
r
ij
C
PD
1− 2Rth
r
ij
C
. (12)
After some algerbraic manipulations, we can get an inequality
as following:
β1r
ij
D/e
1+
β2PD
2β1 ≥
β1r
ij
C
rijC − 2Rth
. (13)
Therefore, c ≥ c. Besides, because β2PD < 2β1, we
can find that
dU
ij
C
(c,α∗ij(c))
dc
> 0 over [c, c]. Consequently,
U ijD (c
∗
ij , α
∗
ij) = U
ij
D (c, α
∗
ij(c)) = 0.
On the other hand, if c1 < c ,it is easy to verify that
U ijD (c1, α
∗
ij(c1)) = 0 now. Using the similar idea, we can
show that c < c. Therefore, we can also conclude that
U ijD (c
∗
ij , α
∗
ij) = U
ij
D (c1, α
∗
ij(c1)) = 0.
Practically, PD is usually small, such as 0.1W. Moreover,
the transmission power is not the major part of the power con-
sumption for UEs, which means that β2 is unlikely to be much
larger than β1. Therefore, the assumption in Proposition 2 is
reasonable in most scenarios. So we assume the condition is
met in our simulations. Intuitionally, Proposition 2 is resulted
from the leading role of CEU in the cooperation. Although the
utility is zero, D2D pair still has an intention to participate in
the cooperation due to positive throughput.
B. Matching Game for Pairing
In this section, we study the pairing problem when there
are several CEUs and D2D pairs. We will model pairing
problem as a marriage market, also known as two-sided one-
to-one matching market. Originally stemmed from economics
[13], matching theory provides a mathematically tractable
solution to handle with the problem of matching players in two
distinct sets, according to each player’s individual preference
and information. Matching theory has become a promising
framework for resource allocation in wireless communication.
This framework has many advantages [14]: (1) It has efficient
distributed implementations without centralized control; (2)
Unlike most game-theoretic solutions, .e.g. Nash equilibrium,
it has more suitable solution when applied to pairing problem;
(3) It defines general preferences that can handle complex
considerations.
In our model, CEU and D2D pair can only be paired when
they agree to cooperate with each other. Therefore, it is natural
to model the interaction between the set of CEUs and the set
of D2D pairs as an one-to-one matching game for solving
the pairing problem. The CEU has a preference over all the
D2D pairs. We use ≻i to denote the ordinal relationship of ith
CEU. For instance, j ≻i j′ means that ith CEU prefers jth
D2D pair to j′th D2D pair. If U ijC (c
∗
ij , α
∗
ij) > U
ij′
C (c
∗
ij , α
∗
ij),
we have j ≻i j′. Besides, if U
ij
C (c
∗
ij , α
∗
ij) = U
ij′
C (c
∗
ij , α
∗
ij)
and RijC ≥ R
ij′
C , we will have j i j
′. Similarly, we can
define the preferences of D2D pairs. Let ≻j denote the ordinal
relationship of jth D2D pair. We use the relationship i ≻i j to
mean that agent j is unacceptable to i, which is equivalent to
the fact that agent i and agent j will not cooperate mutually
in proposed scenario. Note that ith CEU is unacceptable to
jth D2D pair if and only if jth D2D pair is unacceptable to
ith CEU.
The major solution concept in matching game is matching
which is defined as follows.
Definition 1: A matching is a function µ from M×N to
M×N such that µ(m) = n if and only if µ(n) = m, and
µ(m) ∈ N ∪ ∅, µ(n) ∈ M∪ ∅, for ∀n ∈ N ∀m ∈M.
The definition implies that the outcome matches the agent
on one side to the one on the other side, or to the empty
set. The agents’ preferences over the matchings are coincident
with their preferences over the matched partner in outcomes.
In this paper, we seek a particular matching structure, which
is defined as follows.
Definition 2: A matching µ is blocked by the CEU-D2D
pair (i, j), if µ(i) 6= j and i ≻j µ(j), j ≻i µ(i). A matching
µ is individual rational if µ(i) i i for ∀i ∈ M ∪ N . A
matching is stable if it is individual rational and not blocked
by any CEU-D2D pair.
Deferred-Acceptance algorithm [15] can be used to find
a stable matching outcome. We propose an algorithm to
solve the joint optimization problem, which is depicted in
Algorithm 1. The algorithm consists of two stages. At the
first stage, D2D pairs send their profile including channel state
information(CSI) to the available CEUs. After receiving the
information from D2D pairs, CEUs can calculate the price
cij according to Theorem 1 and establish their preferences
over D2D pairs respectively. Then CEUs send the information
containing CSI and price cij to D2D pairs. Each D2D pair
can choose its best strategy αij according to the received
information, and rank the CEUs depending on the achievable
utility and data rate. At the second stage, each CEU proposes
to its most preferred D2D pairs. Then each D2D pair will
accept the most preferred one among the proposed CEUs and
reject the rest. After that, the rejected CEUs propose to the
next favourite D2D pairs and each D2D pair compares the new
Algorithm 1: A Joint Optimization Algorithm
Initialization: Let PCi and P
D
j be the preference list of CEU i and
D2D pair j respectively.
Stage 1: Price Adjustment and Spectrum Leasing
1 CEUs and D2D pairs exchange their profile information:
i Each CEU i computes the price c∗ij for every D2D pair j.
ii Each D2D pair j chooses the best strategy α∗ij according
to c∗ij .
2 Each CEU i establishes its preference list PCi which only
contains acceptable D2D pairs. And each D2D pair j establishes
its preference list PDi , similarly.
Stage 2: CEU-D2D Pairing
WHILE ∃m ∈ M who was rejected
3 Each CEU j ∈ M applies to its favourite D2D pair according
to its preference.
4 Each D2D pair chooses the most preferred one considering the
previous partner (if any) and the new applicants, and rejects the
rest.
5 If CEU j ∈ M is rejected, it removes the D2D pair which it
applies to at current round from its preference list PCj .
proposers and its temporary partner then selects the favourite
one. The procedure will continue until no CEU is rejected.
Any tie is broken in arbitrary way.
The complexity of stage 2 is O(MN). The stable matching
for marriage market always exists [13], [15]. Besides, we note
that the outcome of Deferred-Acceptance algorithm is optimal
for the set of players who make the proposals [13]. Therefore,
the proposed algorithm will lead to a stable matching between
CEUs and D2D pairs, which is optimal in term of CEUs.
It can be found that the stable matching structure is closely
related to the preferences of CEUs and D2D pairs, which
also depend on the resulting utilities from different CEU-
D2D pairs formed. Furthermore, it turns out that the resulting
payoffs are directly determined by allocation coefficients and
pricing coefficients. By using the optimal pricing coefficients
and allocation coefficients (c∗ij , α
∗
ij), CEU i and D2D j can
have the highest payoff when they form a CEU-D2D pair.
Therefore, the outcome is stable in the sense that each CEU
cannot improve its payoff further by unilaterally changing its
price coefficient or paired partner and each D2D pair cannot
improve its payoff, neither.
IV. SIMULATIONS
The performance of our proposed joint optimization algo-
rithm is investigated through simulation in this section. We
use the pathloss based channel model considering multi-path
fading [10]. For example, the channel gain between CEU i
and BS can be expressed as:
hib = KγibL
−η
ib (14)
where K is a constant determined by system parameter, γib
is fast fading with exponential distribution, η is the pathloss
exponent and Lib is the distance between the BS and CEU
i. The CEUs are distributed at the edge of the cell, and the
D2D pairs are uniformly within the cell. We also assume the
distance between the CEUs and DTs is less than 300 meters.
When computing the utility function, we set β1 = 1 and
TABLE II: Simulation Configure Parameters
Parameters Value
Cell radius 500
Noise power(N0) -114dBm
Pathloss constant(K) 10−2
Pathloss exponent(η) 4
CEU Tx power(PC ) 100mW
D2D Tx power(PD ) 100mW
Distance bewteen DT and DR 20m
Numbers of CEUs (N ) 20
Required SNR for CEUs 5dB
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Fig. 3: Performance of proposed algorithm with different
numbers of D2D pairs
β2 = 10. The detailed configuration parameters are depicted
in Table.II.
We first present the total utility and sum-rate of each agent
with different numbers of D2D pairs using proposed algorithm
in Fig.3. We can observe that the total utility of D2D pairs is
always zero, which complies with Proposition 2. However,
the zero-utility doesn’t mean the zero sum-rate. The D2D
pairs have high sum-rate although their total utility is zero.
Consequently, D2D pairs are motivated to cooperate with
CEUs. Besides, the total and sum-rate of CEUs are increasing
with the increase of the number of D2D pairs. The major
reason for performance improvement is that the more D2D
pairs means the more opportunities to find better partners.
We mainly compare the following two approaches for our
scenario. The first one is random matching with Stackelberg
game. In this scheme, D2D pairs and CEUs are randomly
matched. The optimal pricing coefficients and allocation coef-
ficients are used if D2D pair and CEU are willing to cooperate
mutually. The second one is stable random with fixed price.
In this scheme, D2D pair decides the best strategy given fixed
price coefficient. Afterwards the second stage of Algorithm 1
is used to decide the matching between D2D pairs and CEUs.
The proposed algorithm is referred to as stable random with
Stackelberg game. We will focus on the performance of CEUs,
because of their leading roles in licensed spectrum.
Fig.4 compares the outage percentage of CEUs with differ-
ent schemes for different number of D2D pairs. Our proposed
algorithm has the least outage percentage. Moreover, we can
observe that the performance achieved by stable matching has
significant gain over that by random matching. That’s because
stable matching takes the preference of each agents into
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Fig. 5: Sum-rate of CEU with different numbers of D2D pairs
consideration while the random matching doesn’t. Because
outrage occurs only when matched partners are unacceptable
to each other and thus price adjustment has a little effect on
outrage percentage, our scheme performs a little better than the
stable matching with fixed price. In addition, when the number
of D2D pairs is more than 20, the outrage percentage achieved
by random matching remains unchanged. That’s because the
number of CEUs is 20, and the available D2D pairs is not
enough when the number of D2D pairs is less than 20. In
this situation, more D2D pairs means that more CEUs can be
matched which leads to the decrease of outrage percentage.
However, when there are more than 20 D2D pairs, each CEU
have a matched partner, and outrage percentage will stay
almost unchanged because of random matching.
Fig.5 compares the sum-rate of CEUs achieved by three
schemes with different number of D2D pairs. As the number
of D2D pairs increases, CEUs get more chance to access the
cooperating relay and sum-rate will be improved. Fig.5 shows
that the proposed joint optimization algorithm yields consid-
erable gain over other schemes. Besides the benefit of stable
matching, price adjustment can improve the performance of
CEU further. Because of the same reason we have mentioned,
the performance of random matching increases at first and
remains unchanged when there are enough D2D pairs.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate a cooperative spectrum sharing
scheme between D2D users and CEUs, where D2D user relays
the cellular data in the uplink to get access to the licensed
channel, so that both sides can improve the quality of service
through cooperation. Thus, unlike underlay and overlay mode,
a win-win situation is achieved. Given the selfishness of each
sides, we use a Stackelberg game to describe the willingness
to cooperation. Further, we establish a stable marriage market
to study the paring problem. We present numerical results to
verify the efficiency of the proposed scheme.
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